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Abstract 
In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics 
concerning the nature of the wave function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science 
regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is 
particularly challenging when focusing on the wave function. According to the wave function 
ontology approach, the wave function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an 
alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave function does not 
represent physical entities. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can 
naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called ‘explanationism’ realism, which has been 
proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If 
my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrarily to what is commonly 
though, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pessimistic-meta induction 
argument, it can be straightforwardly extended also to the quantum domain; (2) the primitive 
ontology approach is in better shape than the wave function ontology approach in resisting the 
pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism.  
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1. Introduction  
Scientific realism would be a commonsensical philosophical position if there weren’t 
powerful counter-arguments to it, the most famous of which is the pessimistic meta-
induction (PMI) argument: since past successful theories turned out to be false, it is 
unwarranted to believe that our current theories are true simply because they are 
successful (Laudan 1981). Some scientific realists have responded to the PMI argument 
by restricting realism to a subset of the theoretical entities of the theory. One particular 
way of doing this is explanationism realism, according to which one should be realist 
with respect to the working posits of the theory, the ones involved in explanations and 
predictions. In contrast, one does not need to commit herself to believe in the existence 
of other presuppositional posits of the theory, since they are somewhat ‘idle’ 
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components (Kitcher 1993; Psillos 1999).  The proponents of this view have argued for it 
in the framework of classical theories (e.g. Fresnel’s theory of light). I think the case for 
explanationism realism is fundamentally incomplete if one does not consider the theory 
change from classical to quantum mechanics. In this paper, I argue that explanationism 
realism can be extended to the quantum framework. In order to show this, I discuss the 
different realist approaches to quantum mechanics, which differ in the interpretation of 
one of the fundamental objects of quantum mechanics: the wave function. On the one 
hand, according to the wave function ontology approach, also known as wave function 
realism, the wave function is a concrete physical entity (Albert 1996; Loewer 1996; 
Lewis 2004, 2005, 2006; Ney 2012, 2013). In contrast, according to the primitive ontology 
(PO) approach (Allori et al. 2008; Allori 2013), the wave function does not represent 
physical objects. I argue that the PO approach can provide what explanationism realism 
needs to defeat the PMI argument in the classical-to-quantum transition. The PO, and 
not the wave function, can be identified with the working posit of quantum theory, and 
as such: (1) it is primarily responsible for the success of both classical and quantum 
mechanics; and (2) it is (suitably) preserved in the classical-to-quantum theory change. 
Notice that explanationism realism so understood provides an argument in favor of the 
PO approach over the wave function ontology approach: being preserved in theory 
change, the PO defeats the PMI argument. In contrast, since the wave function does not 
have any classical analog, if wave function realism is true it is hard to see how the 
working posits are preserved in the transition from classical to quantum mechanics. 
This, wave function realism may undermine scientific realism about quantum 
mechanics.    
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, I overview the PMI 
argument against scientific realism and some replies to it, focusing on explanationism 
realism. Then in Sections 3 I explain how the transition from classical to quantum 
mechanics is a problem for explanationism realism. In Sections 4 and 5 I present the PO 
approach as a framework to understand fundamental physical theories, I show how the 
PO is preserved through the classical-to-quantum theory change and I argue that it is 
the PO, rather than the wave function, which is responsible for the empirical success of 
quantum mechanics. In Section 7 I discuss some objections to the previous discussion, 
and I provide with some replies. Finally, in the last section I discuss the advantage of 
the PO approach over wave function realism approach in responding to the PMI 
argument.  
 
2. The Pessimistic Meta Induction and Explanationism Realism  
Scientific realism is, roughly put, the view that scientific theories give us a (nearly) 
truthful description of the world. The main argument for scientific realism, the no-
miracle argument holds that the empirical success of a theory can, and should, be taken 
as evidence of its truth. Nonetheless, there are very powerful arguments against 
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scientific realism, like the pessimistic meta-induction, or PMI, argument. The main idea 
of the PMI is to go against the no-miracle argument. The claim is that it is not the case 
that the empirical success of a theory is a reliable indicator of its truth: since past 
theories were empirically successful but turned out to be false, it follows that our 
current theories, even if successful, are more likely to be false than true. 
One way to respond to the PMI challenge is to argue that one should be realist 
about a restricted set of entities, not about the whole theory. This is what Psillos calls a 
divide et impera strategy: scientific realists may argue that “when a theory is abandoned, 
its theoretical constituents, i.e. the theoretical mechanisms and laws posited, should not 
be rejected en bloc. Some of those theoretical constituents are inconsistent with what we 
now accept, and therefore they have to be rejected. But not all are. Some of them have 
been retained as essential constituents of subsequent theories” (Psillos 1991, p. 108). 
Therefore, if one can show that the entities that are retained in moving from one theory 
to the next are the ones that are responsible for the empirical success of the theory, the 
PMI argument is blocked. By restricting realism one provides an alternative explanation 
for the success of past false-but-successful theories:  past theories were successful not 
because they were (approximately) true in their entirety, but because some parts of 
them were. If these true constituents of past theories are responsible for the theories’ 
success and they are carried over in theory change, then we are justified in believing 
that the entities these theoretical constituents represent exist in reality.  
There are various ways to restrict realism. One example is Worrall’s structural 
realism (Worrall 1989), according to which the PMI is correct in saying that in theory 
change we often have discontinuity at the level of unobservable entities, but most of the 
mathematical content of the old theory carries over to the new one. Therefore, the 
scientific realist may not be justified in believing what the theory says about the nature 
of physical objects. Nonetheless she is justified in believing that the structure that holds 
between these objects which is preserved in theory change is (approximately) true. 
There are different varieties of structural realism, a first rough distinction is the one 
between epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. In the epistemic 
version, which some attribute to Worrall himself, we are only justified in believing that 
objects stand in certain structural relations with one another. Ontic structural realism 
instead goes further and claims that the very notion of objects is problematic and is 
worth dismissing (French 1998; Ladyman 1998). There are other responses to the PMI 
argument, but in this paper I will focus on explanationism realism, developed most 
prominently by Kitcher (1993) and Psillos (1999). They distinguish between ‘working’ 
and ‘presuppositional’ posits of a theory. The working posits are the ones that are 
responsible for the theory’s empirical success, while the presuppositional posits are 
theoretical constituents needed to complete the theory. If the working posits are 
preserved during theory change, the argument goes, one could argue that past theories 
were successful because they got something right, namely the working posits. At the 
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same time, when considered in their entirety, these theories are also false since they got 
something wrong too, namely the presuppositional posits. Thus, the realist is justified 
in believing in the working posits, but there is no need for her to commit to the 
existence of the presuppositional posits: they are just ‘idle’ components, which make no 
difference to the theory’s success. 
 
3. The Classical-to-Quantum Theory Change as a Problem for Explanationism 
Realism  
Scientific realism has been motivated and discussed almost exclusively in the classical 
framework, discussing theories other than quantum mechanics. In particular, Psillos 
and Kitcher argue for explanationism realism within Fresnel’s theory of light. It was 
successful because it got the working posit right, namely the electromagnetic waves: 
they are responsible for the success of the theory, and they were preserved by 
Maxwell’s electrodynamics. In contrast, ether was a presuppositional posit: the success 
of Fresnel’s theory did not depend on it, and it was abandoned by the subsequent 
theory. Realists are therefore justified in believing that electromagnetic waves exist, but 
do not have to be committed to believe that ether exists too. Another example 
extensively discussed in the literature is the caloric theory of heat, or phlogiston’s 
theory of combustion, to again arrive to the conclusion that caloric and phlogiston are 
presuppositional posits. In reply, these historical examples have been revisited with the 
intent of arguing that ether, caloric, phlogiston, and the like, contrarily to what it is 
maintained by explanationism realism, played an important role in the success of past 
theories (see, e.g. Psillos (1994), Chang (2003), Elsamahi (2005)).  
Regardless of the outcome of the debate over these examples, the main threat to 
explanationism realism comes from the classical-to-quantum transition. The fact that 
the discussion was limited to classical theories is not surprising: quantum mechanics 
has been considered, for a long time, incompatible with scientific realism. While, on the 
one hand, quantum theory is incredibly powerful in making new and very precise 
predictions, on the other hand it is extremely difficult to understand and ‘make sense’ 
of. Indeed, quantum mechanics has been taken by many to suggest that physical objects 
have contradictory properties, like being in a place and not being in that place at the 
same time, or that properties do not exist at all independently of observation. Given 
that, many have thought that the real lesson of quantum mechanics is that scientific 
realism is impossible. Luckily, the situation has changed: today we have various 
proposal of quantum theories that allow for a realist reading. Among these theories, 
most famously we find Bohmian mechanics (Bohm 1952), Everettian, or many-words, 
quantum mechanics(Everett 1957), and the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini & Weber 
1986): they are empirically adequate fundamental quantum theories according to which 
there is an objective physical world, which can be described by non-contradictory, 
mind-independent properties.  
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Nonetheless, even in this framework the examples from quantum mechanics are 
brought up to motivate ontic structural realism rather than explanationism realism: “we 
have learned from contemporary physics is that the nature of space, time and matter are 
not compatible with standard metaphysical views about the ontological relationship 
between individuals, intrinsic properties and relations” (Ladyman 2014). Most 
importantly, in quantum mechanics we have the Schrödinger equation, which is the 
equation for the temporal evolution of the wave function. The wave function is an 
object which is involved in the derivation of most, if not all, predictions and 
explanations the theory is able to provide. Thus, in the framework provided by 
explanationism realism, it seems one should regard the wave function as a working 
posit of quantum theory. If so, though, explanationism realism is not able to defeat the 
PMI, since the wave function arguably does not have any classical analog and therefore 
we have radical discontinuity in the classical-to-quantum theory change. This is bad 
news, since the case for explanationism realism has no hope of being compelling if does 
not cover quantum mechanics. In the next section, though, I show how explanationism 
realism can be extended to quantum theories if paired with a particular view about the 
metaphysics of quantum mechanics, namely the primitive ontology, or PO, approach.  
 
4. Primitive Ontology  
Most philosophers of physics recognize the legitimacy of Bohmian mechanics, 
Everettian theory and GRW, but disagree about the metaphysical pictures these theories 
provide. In this section, I discuss the PO approach. In the next section I argue that all 
these theories have a primitive ontology such that:  (1) it is the primary responsible of 
the theory’s success; and (2) it (suitably) carries over during theory change. If so, and 
assuming that a strategy like explanationism realism is successful in defending scientific 
realism, the PMI argument is blocked: the realist is justified in believing that the PO is 
real because it does all the work to explain empirical success of theories and it is 
preserved in theory change.  
Here is a brief summary of the PO account (Allori et al. 2008; Allori 2013). 
Arguably, classical theories such as Newtonian mechanics, classical electrodynamics 
and statistical mechanics share a common way of understanding how fundamental 
physical theories account for the behavior of macroscopic phenomena. The reason is 
that all these theory possesses a primitive ontology:  some variable in three-dimensional 
space (or four-dimensional space-time) that represent physical objects. For classical 
theories, the PO was point-particles1. If we wish to preserve such common framework 
any other fundamental physical theory should have a primitive ontology as well. The 
primitive variables in the quantum theories proposed so far in the literature include 
point-particles, continuous fields, and spatio-temporal events or ‘flashes.’ For instance, 
                                                          
1 For the case of classical electrodynamics, see Allori (2015).  
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Bohmian mechanics is a theory with a particle PO (Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghí 1992), 
GRWm is a theory in which matter is described by a continuous (three-dimensional) 
matter field localized where the macroscopic objects are (Benatti, Ghirardi and Grassi 
1995), while GRWf is a theory of ‘flashes,’ spatio-temporal events (Bell 1987, Tumulka 
2006)2. In addition of specifying what matter is, we need to specify how it behaves. This 
is implemented by the so-called nomological variables, most importantly by the wave 
function. The fundamental idea is that the wave function does not represent material 
things, but rather determines how material things move. On the one hand, the wave 
function is a necessary ingredient to implement the law of temporal evolution of the PO 
(Allori 2013). For instance, in Bohmian mechanics the wave function evolves according 
to the Schrödinger equation, while in GRWf and GRWm it evolves according to 
Schrödinger equation and then randomly collapses, following the so-called GRW 
evolution. In Bohmian mechanics the wave function generates the spatio-temporal 
trajectories of the PO through an equation appropriately dubbed the guide equation. 
Similarly in GRWm , with a different equation the wave function generates the spatio-
temporal behavior of the mass-density field.  In GRWf, the wave function enters in the 
probability distribution of the flashes, and therefore determines where they are located 
in space-time. In this sense, the wave function is indispensable, it enters in the 
predictions and in the explanation of the phenomena. Nonetheless, on the other hand, 
the PO is the one that makes direct contact with the phenomena and is ultimately 
responsible for explanations and predictions. In fact, one of the important features of 
the PO approach is its architectural component: on the foundation there is the PO, the 
building block of everything else, and then you have layers of other entities, each of 
which acquires its significance and its role in the theory via the way they affect the PO. 
They contribute generating the empirically adequate trajectories of the PO which 
ultimately make contact with the phenomena and play the explanatory role. The wave 
function should be thought as belonging to this latter category of entities: it helps the 
PO to explain and to predict, but it is not ultimately responsible for these things.   
Here are some fundamental features of the PO approach that is crucial to 
articulate:  
1)  REDUCTIONISM with respect to the PO. In this approach macroscopic objects are 
thought to be fundamentally composed of the microscopic entities the PO 
specifies. As such, the PO approach is (ontologically) reductionist, at least to the 
extent that it allows to make sense of claims like the PO being “the building 
blocks of everything else,” and of the idea that macroscopic regularities are 
obtained entirely from the microscopic trajectories of the PO.  
2) EXPLANATION and PO. The PO explains the macroscopic regularities using 
reductionist approaches similar to those used in classical mechanics. In fact, in 
                                                          
2 For other examples, see Allori et al (2008), and Allori et al (2011). 
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classical mechanics, macroscopic bodies are made of a collection of particles, and 
their properties are accounted for in terms of the interaction of these particles 
among each other and the particles of the environment. For instance, the 
transparency of a pair of glasses is explained in terms of the electromagnetic 
forces acting between the particles composing the glasses, which are such that 
incoming light rays will pass through them (Resnick and Halliday 1966). 
Similarly, the PO grounds the explanatory schema of quantum theories: the 
properties of macroscopic objects are (in principle) accounted for in terms of the 
PO’s behavior (Allori 2013). 
3) THEOREITICAL VIRTUES. The PO of a theory is postulated, rather than inferred 
from the formalism, on the basis of some super-empirical virtues such as 
simplicity, explanatory power, and unification. The PO that provides the 
simplest, most unifying explanation should be selected (Allori 2015). 
4) UNDERDETERMINATION of the WAVE FUNCTION. The way the wave function 
evolves in time is irrelevant as long as the law of the PO such wave function 
defines remains the same. That is, a theory of particles which follow certain 
trajectories, like Bohmian mechanics, can be obtained by a Schrödinger-evolving 
wave function, like in the usual formulation, but also in terms of a collapsed 
wave function (Allori et al. 2008). Two theories with the same trajectories for the 
PO, regardless of how they have been obtained (i.e., via a Schrödinger evolving 
wave function or not) are physically equivalent. Since different wave functions can 
give rise to the same trajectories for the PO, and since the trajectories of the PO 
are the ones that account for the macroscopic regularities, the wave function 
evolution is underdetermined by the data. Since the evolution of the wave 
function is underdetermined, the same trajectories of the PO do not uniquely 
pick out a wave function. Indeed, it is possible to try to eliminate the wave 
function completely, as something have tried (Dowker and Herbauts 2006; 
Norsen 2010). 
5) PREDICTIONS and PO. Once the PO and its law of evolution have been chosen, 
everything else is determined, including the empirical predictions which are 
determined as a function of the PO. The wave function appears into the 
derivation of the predictions of the theory, but its role is not essential, since the 
way in which it specifies the law of the PO is underdetermined (Allori et al. 
2014).   
 
5. Quantum Mechanics and Explanationism Realism 
I wish to argue now that the PO can be identified with the working posit of quantum 
mechanics, while the wave function is best seen as a presuppositional posit. In fact, as 
discussed in (5) in the list in the previous section, the predictions are determined by the 
PO, not by the wave function. It appears in the derivation but its evolution is 
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underdetermined by data, as we saw in (4). In addition, as we saw in (2), explanation is 
in terms of the PO: this reminds of Kitcher’s idea that working posits are the entities 
that play a fundamental role in the theory’s explanatory schemata. Moreover, there is 
the explicit fundamental postulation that the PO represent matter, while the wave 
function does not, and that everything is made of the entities the PO specifies, as we 
saw in (1). All primitive ontologists (or supporters of suitably related views) maintain 
that one should be realist about the PO, regardless of what they think the wave function 
really is. In fact, it has been considered to be, among other things, a law-like object 
(Goldstein, Dürr & Zanghí 2013), a disposition (Esfeld et al. 2014), a property (Monton 
2006), or a new kind entity (Maudlin 2013). Some others have denied, in line with the 
Humean tradition, an ontological status of the wave function, taking it to be a 
parameter that supervenes on the Humean mosaic that is provided by the PO (Bhogal & 
Perry 2017; Callender 2015; Esfeld 2014). Nonetheless, I ague, one can be 
‘metaphysically neutral’ with respect to the wave function: one does not need to commit 
to the existence or non-existence of the wave function in order to account for the success 
of the theory. But this is to say that the PO is a working posit, while the wave function is 
a presuppositional posit of quantum theories. If so, the PO approach provides a very 
nice framework for the explanationist realist to extent her view in the quantum domain.  
We have made good progress so far. However, this is not enough to successfully 
reply to the PMI argument: one would also have to show that the PO is preserved 
during theory change. What is the PO of classical mechanics? Arguably, in classical 
mechanics matter is made of particles, objects with the fundamental property of having 
a position in three-dimensional space. Therefore, for quantum theories of particles like 
Bohmian mechanics, the preservation of PO during the classical-to-quantum theory 
change is obvious. The interesting cases are the ones that involve a mater density PO 
and a flash PO. In both cases, literally, the PO of classical mechanics has not 
straightforwardly carried over.  
There seems to be two options: either dispute that these are cases of radical 
discontinuity, or take this to be an argument against a non-particle PO. I think the latter: 
particles are the simplest PO, and I do not see why one would make things complicated 
if there is no need. If you add to this that particles make it easier to defeat the PMI, then 
the case is even more straightforward. Nonetheless, some may argue that is not true 
that a particle PO is not enough mentioning that ‘flashy’ theories like GRWf are more 
compatible with relativity than particle theories like Bohmian mechanics (Tumulka 
2006). I think this is not necessarily the case, as relativistic, non-artificial particle 
quantum theories have been proposed (Dürr et al. 1998). Be that as it may, one could 
also argue that the classical-to-quantum change in PO from particles to non-particles is 
not a case of radical discontinuity after all. In fact, while it is not true that there are 
particles, it is still the case that there is ‘stuff’ in three-dimensional space. In other words, 
we do not bet the nature of objects correctly in classical mechanics since we believed 
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there were particles while actually there are not. Nonetheless, the assumption that there 
are three-dimensional entities is left unaffected, and there is as sense in which this non-
particle three-dimensional ‘stuff’ behave as if it were a particle.  Let me elaborate. 
Consider the case in which people went from believing that atoms are indivisible to 
believe that they are made of other indivisible particles. The old theory got right that 
there are particles, but it was wrong about which the fundamental particles really were. 
The situation here is different: we move from a theory in which the fundamental entities 
are particles, to a theory in which the fundamental entities have another nature. This is, 
arguably, what would happen from a quantum theory of particles to string theory. In 
this case we are not getting right the nature of the fundamental entities: before we had 
one-dimensional particles, now we have bi-dimensional vibrating loops.  However, if 
we ‘squint,’ then we don’t see the fine-grained details, and we take strings to be 
particles. They are, for all explanatory purposes, particles: we explain the macroscopic 
regularities in terms of the PO, namely three-dimensional ‘stuff, ignoring the details 
about what its real nature actually is. This is similar to the case in which we observe a 
hose from a distance and we think it is one-dimensional while it is actually two-
dimensional, or when we look at a poster in the subway and we think it’s an image 
while instead it is a collection of colored dots. At the level of microphysics we may have 
flashes or a continuous field, but at some mesoscopic level they produce trajectories as 
if they are produced by particles. So, even if the microscopic PO is not one of particles, 
there is a mesoscopic scale in which they behave as if they are, and then from that level 
up to the macroscopic level, the explanation is the same as if they were particles.    
Notice that this option is not available to the wave function realist. In fact, one 
might think that she could argue along the very same lines I just did by saying: “we do 
not get the nature of objects right because we believe they are particles in classical 
mechanics and then we discover they are actually, say, patterns in the wave function; 
but we get something right, namely that on some mesoscopic level they behave as if 
their nature were the one of particles.” The disanalogy between this and my argument 
is that in the latter what is crucial is the existence of microscopic patterns at the 
fundamental level in three-dimensional space. It is only because the fundamental 
objects described by the primitive ontology are in such space that we can ‘squint’ and 
recover the familiar macroscopic word. In contrast, in the world described by wave 
function realism one needs to do much more than mere ‘squinting.’ Indeed, it is unclear 
what is necessary to do from the highly-dimensional fundamental space to the three-
dimensional world of our experiences: different approaches have been proposed, and 
they are all work in progress (see most notably (Albert 2013, 2015); (Lewis 2013); (Ney 
2105, forthcoming a, forthcoming b); (North 2013)).  In connection to this, a well-known 
argument against wave function realism is the so-called macro-object problem, namely 
that wave function realism cannot account for three-dimensional objects (Monton 2002; 
Maudlin 2007; Allori 2013). Note that my remark is different: even if the wave function 
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realist would be able to account for them, the explanation would have to rely on totally 
new mechanisms. In fact while the PO approach can rely on compositionality and 
reductionism techniques, this is not the case within wave function realism (see Allori 
(2013) for a similar remark, and Ney (forthcoming a) and reference therein for a 
presentation of some of the new strategies and what is required by them).  
 
6. Possible Objections and Replies  
One could object that it is wrongheaded to think the wave function is not a working 
posit of quantum mechanics. In fact, In Kitcher’s characterization, the working posits 
are the ones that are indispensable for the explanation of the phenomena. Therefore, 
one may think that the wave function is exactly that: it is needed to make contact with 
the experimental predictions just as well as the PO. It helps explain why the particle, say, 
goes this way rather than that way in a magnetic field just as well as the PO. Hence, the 
wave function is not a working posit but a presuppositional posit3. As a reply, I think 
the correct way to think about the wave function is that it is not needed just as well as 
the PO, neither to make contact with the phenomena nor to explain. In fact, remember 
the architectural structure of the PO approach: in contrast with the PO, the wave 
function is not at the foundation of a fundamental physical theory and even if it helps 
the PO to explain and to predict, it is not what is responsible of these things.  
Another objection could be that the chosen example makes things too easy for 
the PO approach. In fact, the particle PO is carried over from classical to quantum 
mechanics by construction, so the question I explore is not very interesting or has great 
significance. In contrast I should ask what is the PO of, say, phlogiston theory and give 
good reason why the PO of phlogiston theory does not include phlogiston4. The same 
could be true for ether as well as for caloric. The issue has been discussed without 
reference to the PO and, as already pointed out in Section 3, people have argued that 
ether, caloric and phlogiston are not among the working posits of the theory. If these 
arguments are convincing, then one may safely claim that ether, caloric and phlogiston 
are not the PO of theses theory either. To elaborate a little, one may point out that, as 
Psillos (1994) does, caloric theory of heat does not contain the material representation of 
heat as a working hypothesis. Rather, what is relevant is the quantity of heat, which 
does not need to have any referent. In addition, Psillos denies the holistic theory of 
confirmation according to which all assumptions of a theory are equally likely to be 
true. In this way, even if caloric theory was successful and regarded as true, it did not 
imply that caloric had necessarily to exist as a material entity. Phlogiston theory 
presupposed the existence of an element, phlogiston, contained within bodies and 
                                                          
3 I owe this objection to Kevin Coffey in his comments to my paper at the Pacific APA (April 
2017).  
4 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me. 
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released during combustion.  As it is known, it was replaced by oxidation theory 
according to which during combustion nothing is given out, but rather oxygen is taken 
in. I will not pursue here an historical research, like Psillos did for caloric, regarding 
whether contemporary scientists were cautious or not regarding the existence of a 
material phlogiston. Be that as it may, it seems to me that what has been said for caloric 
applies here too: what matters is that something was exchanged, and experiments later 
revealed it was taken in rather than given out, as postulated by the phlogiston theory. 
In the case of ether, the situation is slightly more complicated but analysis leads to the 
result that ether is a working posit.  One may think of classical electrodynamics as a 
theory with different POs (Allori 2015). On the one hand, classical electrodynamics 
could be taken to be a theory with a particle PO where the electromagnetic fields are 
treated as nomological variables. In this case ether, as well as the electromagnetic fields, is 
by definition a working posit, namely something that is needed to account for the 
phenomena but never the phenomena themselves. On the other hand, one could think 
of classical fields as part of the PO together with the charged particles, and also in this 
case ether would just be part of the ingredients to explain macroscopic regularities, and 
thus a working posit.  Thus, it seems unwarranted to think of caloric, phlogiston or 
ether as part of the PO of the respective theories: the PO is given by the current 
fundamental theory, namely Newtonian mechanics and classical electrodynamics. Then 
the behavior of such PO is refined by experiments and formalized in subsequent 
theories: kinetic theory, oxygen theory and relativity.  
An anonymous referee has suggested that ‘flashy’ theories is not so easy to 
accommodate in the squinting argument I elaborated above, since there may be 
situations in which no amount of squinting will allow us to recover particle-like 
behavior from the behavior of flashes. The referee wants us to consider a beta-particle in 
a cloud chamber. According to GRWf, the beta-particle itself will on average flash only 
once in 108 years. The ‘particle’ track is accounted for by flashes of the surrounding gas 
particles. Then the referee writes that: “if the beta particle is to play any role in this 
explanation (as it does in the classical picture), it is entirely due to its wave function; its 
flashes (even in the very improbable case that there is one) are completely irrelevant.” I 
believe the referee may be missing some crucial ingredient of the PO account. In fact, 
the flashes are not irrelevant: they are the things drawing the track of the beta-particle. 
The wave function determines the distribution of the flashes in space-time, and as such 
contribute to explain why the track looks one way rather than another. But one should 
not over-estimate this explanation, which would be empty without the PO.  
Another, perhaps more challenging worry is the following: isn’t my proposal just 
some sort of (ontic) structuralism? If we do not preserve the nature of ‘stuff,’ isn’t what 
we preserve some structural content of the theory? In replying to this, let me first make 
a clarification: if structuralism is the view that there is just structure and no objects as 
individuals, then clearly not, since the PO approach postulates the existence of objects 
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as a starting point. Instead, what about a moderate version of ontic structural realism, 
like the one proposed by Esfeld (2004)? The idea behind this view is something like this: 
one should be realist about structure but, in contrast with the ‘eliminativist’ ontic 
structuralism mentioned above, there are ‘things’ (individuals) that stand in the relation 
the structure prescribes, even if they have no intrinsic identities. In the quantum 
domain, such structure is the wave function. Indeed, interestingly enough, (Esfeld 2017) 
proposes that in his moderate ontic structuralism, the relata the wave function relates 
are given by the PO: he argues that the PO approach and his moderate ontic 
structuralism can help each other make sense of quantum non-locality and 
entanglement.  So, in his view, we should be realist about the PO, and also about the 
structure that relates the PO, provided by the wave function.  In this sense, the reading I 
provide of the PO approach is different: the strength of the PO approach in responding 
to the PMI argument is that it regards the wave function as a working posit. Only 
because of this, one can show there is continuity of PO during theory change. Instead 
Esfeld’s moderate ontic structuralism in this ‘flat’ reading I have just provided does not 
have this advantage: if the wave function is the structure the realist should be 
committing to, then it is difficult to see where this structure was coming from in 
classical physics. In light of the fact that Esfeld has previously argued Esfeld (2014) that 
the wave function should be just considered as part of the Humean mosaic, I think the 
best way to think about this approach is to emphasize the architectural component of 
the PO approach and re-read Esfeld’s moderate structuralism as non-flat. That is, one 
would maintain that the PO constitute the foundation of the theory, while the relations 
(in which the wave function plays an important role) generate the macroscopic 
appearances through the PO. In this way, since the focus is on the PO, one need not 
think of the wave function as a working posit, and thus defeat the PMI.  
Let me close this section pointing out how the PO approach can help replying to 
one common objection to explanationism realism as originally proposed. The charge is 
that the distinction between working posits and presuppositional posits can be drawn 
only after one discovers that the original theory is false. That is, the working posits are 
what we see have carried over (see, e.g. Stanford (2003a, 2003b)), and this is bad because 
if you do not know what are the presuppositional posits of the theory then you do not 
know what you are justified in believing.  In the PO framework this is not true. In fact, 
the PO is postulated when the theory is proposed, rather than inferred from the 
formalism or selected post-hoc: it is the one that provides the best combination of 
simplicity, explanatory power and unification that is able to account for the 
experimental data. In this way, what is a working posit is selected from the time the 
theory is proposed.  
 
7. An Argument for the PO Approach over Wave Function Realism based on 
Scientific Realism 
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The above analysis also provides the PO approach with an important advantage over 
the alternative wave function realism. In fact, as I argue in this section, in contrast with 
being realist about the PO, being realist about the wave function may undermine the 
tenability of scientific realism itself in the quantum domain. Here is the reason. In the 
wave function ontology approach the wave function is a concrete physical field and 
represents matter. If we analyze this view in terms of explanationism realism the wave 
function is a working posit of quantum theory. The problem with this is that, 
mathematically, the wave function is an object that lives in the high dimensional 
configuration space, and as such is a very different entity from classical particles. In 
addition, the image of the world provided by the wave function ontology approach is 
very different from the image of the world given to us by classical mechanics: in the 
latter there are particles moving in three-dimensional space, in the former there is this 
matter field in a highly-dimensional space. In the classical-to-quantum transition we 
discover that not only we were getting the nature of objects wrong (we believed there 
were particles and actually there are none) but we cannot get our classical picture back 
by ‘squinting,’ like in the PO framework, since the fundamental physical space is not 
three-dimensional. In this way, there is no continuity of working posits between 
classical and quantum mechanics, and the strategy to resist to the PMI argument along 
the lines of explanationism realism is precluded to the proponent of wave function 
realism. If there is truly a quantum revolution, as wave function realism seems to 
maintain to a give extent (Allori 2015), and the way in which we understand the word 
using quantum theory is fundamentally different from the way in which we understood 
it in classical terms, then what is our justification to believe that the theoretical terms 
used in quantum mechanics are (approximately) true?  
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